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Abstract
The Henry George Theorem (HGT), or the golden rule of local public ﬁnance, states that,
in ﬁrst-best economies, the ﬁscal surplus, deﬁned as aggregate land rents minus aggregate losses
from increasing returns to scale activities, is zero at optimal city sizes. We derive a general
second-best HGT in which the ﬁscal surplus equals the excess burden, expressed as an extended
Harberger formula. We then apply our theorem to various settings encompassing urban eco-
nomics, the new economic geography and local public ﬁnance to investigate whether or not
a single tax on land rents can raise enough revenue to cover aggregate losses from increasing
returns to scale activities.
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11 Introduction
The equilibrium sizes of agglomerations such as cities (or communities and shopping centers), are
determined by the balance between increasing and decreasing returns to spatial concentration. As
is well known, cities need not be optimally sized at equilibrium as the urban environment is replete
with externalities. Recent empirical research suggests that any departure from optimal city size
can generate sizeable economic costs, especially in terms of foregone productivity (e.g., Au and
Henderson, 2006a, 2006b). Hence, elaborating eﬃcient urban growth policies is likely to be of ﬁrst-
order importance to many countries, especially developing ones. An important preliminary step for
devising such urban policies is to assess whether cities are too large or too small, and by how much.
The ‘golden rule’ of local public ﬁnance (Flatters et al., 1974), i.e., the Henry George Theorem
(henceforth HGT; Stiglitz, 1977; Arnott and Stiglitz, 1979) provides a condition for the optimal size
of a city or, equivalently, the optimal number of cities given a ﬁxed total population. It is thus a
potentially useful tool that can allow policy makers to assess whether cities are too large or too small.1
Another application of the HGT is concerned with smaller agglomerations such as shopping centers
and business subcenters that are often developed by private companies. Those developers capture
increases in land prices to ﬁnance development costs. The HGT shows that free entry of developers
yields an eﬃcient allocation in a ﬁrst-best world. It would be of interest for policy makers to know
whether developments are too few or too many in a more realistic setting with various distortions.
The HGT may be viewed as an extension of the result on the optimal number of ﬁrms in an indus-
try — entry into an industry is optimal when the marginal social beneﬁt of the last entrant vanishes.
In a spatial context, this optimality condition must be extended to include land rents: aggregate
land rents (which capitalize agglomeration beneﬁts) equal the aggregate losses from increasing re-
turns activities that generate agglomeration. For example, if the driving force for agglomeration is
a pure local public good, then the cost of its supply must be equal to aggregate land rents at the
optimal city size. In the case of a factory town, where ﬁrm-level scale economies generate spatial
concentration, aggregate land rents must be equal to the losses that the ﬁrm would incur if it were
constrained to price at marginal cost. In a new economic geography (henceforth NEG) model with
increasing returns and product diﬀerentiation, aggregate land rents must be equal to the subsidies
paid to ﬁrms in order to achieve eﬃcient production scale and optimum product diversity.
As is well known, the HGT holds in a ﬁrst-best world without distortions but not necessarily in
a second-best world (see Arnott, 2004, for a recent survey). However, as highlighted by the latter
two foregoing examples, most factors that drive the concentration of economic activity involve some
form of market failure. Thus, for the HGT to be of practical relevance it must be extended to cope
1Kanemoto et al. (1996, 2005) applied these ideas to empirically test the often-made claim that Tokyo, with a
metropolitan population of about 30 million, is much too large. It is not easy to obtain reliable estimates of key
variables such as the aggregate land rents and the aggregate Pigouvian subsidies in a city, but the HGT provides a
promising theoretical framework for empirical studies. As stated by Arnott (2004, pp.1086–1087): “Does the Henry
George Theorem provide a practical guide to optimal city size? The jury is not yet in, but the approach is suﬃciently
promising to merit further exploration.”
2with settings encompassing distortions of various kinds. This has, to the best of our knowledge,
not been systematically done to date. The purpose of this article is to ﬁll that gap by identifying
conditions under which the HGT holds even in a second-best economy — an economy where policy
makers can implement the optimal size of an agglomeration but are constrained to take production
and consumption decisions (including entry decisions of ﬁrms) and the resulting equilibrium prices
as given. We also examine in which directions the theorem needs to be modiﬁed should it fail to
hold in such a world.
Several related articles have examined variations on the HGT in a second-best world. First,
Arnott (2004, p.1073) showed that “in distorted urbanized economies the generalized HGT continues
to hold when the aggregate magnitudes are valued at shadow prices.” The article does not, however,
suggest how these shadow prices can be calculated, thereby limiting the practical relevance of the
generalized HGT. Second, Helsley and Strange (1990) showed that the theorem does not hold in
a matching framework of urban labor markets where ﬁrms compete for workers on a circle of skill
ranges and where wages are determined via Nash bargaining. Last, Behrens and Murata (2009)
examined a monocentric city model with monopolistic competition and showed that the HGT holds
at the second best if and only if the second-best allocation is ﬁrst-best eﬃcient. In their model, the
latter holds true only in the constant elasticity of substitution (henceforth CES) case.2
As should be clear from the foregoing literature review, whether or not the HGT holds at the
second best hinges on the chosen modeling framework. Unlike previous approaches that rely from the
beginning on speciﬁc functional forms, our aim is to derive a more general version of a second-best
HGT and apply it to various models of spatial concentration, including those of the NEG and of
local public goods. Our methodology allows us to obtain general results without resorting to speciﬁc
functional forms. Using the concept of ﬁscal surplus, deﬁned as aggregate land rents minus aggregate
losses from increasing returns, the HGT at the ﬁrst best simply states that the ﬁscal surplus is zero
when the cities are of optimal size (or, alternatively, when the number of cities is optimal). In a
second-best world the ﬁscal surplus equals the excess burden created by increasing either city size
or the number of cities. We show that the latter can be expressed as an extension of the Harberger
formula, i.e., the weighted sum of induced changes in quantities and product diversity, with weights
being the associated distortions. Our formula extends the original by adding distortions in product
diversity that play an important role in monopolistic competition models.
To illustrate the usefulness of our results in a simple setting, we apply the second-best HGT to
diﬀerent NEG-type models where distortions originate only from the diﬀerentiated good sector. In
these models, distortions take two forms: a price distortion for each variety of the diﬀerentiated good,
and a distortion for the number of varieties consumed. The variety distortion works in the opposite
direction of the price distortion. We show that when the utility function is additively separable with
respect to varieties as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the price distortion depends on the relative risk
aversion (RRA) and the variety distortion is inversely related to the scale elasticity of utility. Unlike
2Many of the results obtained in the CES model (markups, ﬁrm size, entry etc.) are clearly knife-edge results. See
Kokovin et al. (2010) for an overview and discussion.
3the former, the latter depends on the absolute level of utility: adding a positive constant to the utility
function makes the variety distortion larger. This result reveals an important diﬀerence between
models with endogenous product diversity (like new trade and NEG models) and expected utility
theory that has not been emphasized much until now. In expected utility theory, utility is unique
up to an aﬃne transformation and its absolute level does not matter. In monopolistic competition
models, the desirability of introducing a new variety hinges on the magnitude of the utility increase it
produces. The utility increase is the diﬀerence between the utility level with equilibrium consumption
and that with zero consumption. Models with endogenous product diversity therefore depend on the
absolute level of utility, whereas expected utility theory depends only on the marginal utility and
higher-order derivatives.
Building on the foregoing results which hold for general functional forms, we turn to speciﬁc
examples to derive sharper predictions. First, we examine a case where the excess burden from the
variety distortion is inﬂuenced by changes in the intersectoral allocation. Using a setting ` a la Abdel-
Rahman and Fujita (1990), we show that the excess burden (and hence the ﬁscal surplus) is positive
at the second-best city size. Second, we consider a case without intersectoral distortions to focus
solely on the diﬀerentiated good sector. Using the variable RRA setting of Ogaki and Zhang (2001),
we show that the excess burden is positive if the RRA is increasing, and negative if it is decreasing.
In the knife-edge case where the RRA is constant, the price and variety distortions just cancel out,
thus yielding the result that the HGT holds even at the second best in a one-sector CES world
(Duranton and Puga, 2001; Behrens and Murata, 2009).3 However, this need not always be the case.
For example, we show that in the case of the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) model used by
Behrens and Murata (2009), the excess burden is negative even though the RRA is increasing. In all
cases, adding a constant term to the sub-utility tends to increase the excess burden, as noted above.
Last, as the HGT has been mainly examined in and applied to models with local public goods (see,
e.g., Ch.3 of Kanemoto, 1980), we examine a simple model with a local public good that is ﬁnanced
by a distortionary property tax on housing. In this setting, the excess burden is again negative.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a model of the optimal
number of communities that is general enough to encompass urban models with externalities, NEG
models, and local public goods models. Section 3 derives our second-best HGT using an extended
Harberger formula. In Section 4, we focus on the price and variety distortions in monopolistic
competition models with and without intersectoral distortions. We derive a more speciﬁc formula
for the second-best HGT and illustrate the variable RRA and CARA cases. In Section 5, we turn to
a local public goods model with a distortionary property tax. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
3Behrens et al. (2010) have recently shown that the HGT continues to hold in a CES model with heterogeneous
agents and sorting along talent across cities. The reason is that, despite heterogeneity and sorting, the underlying
tradeoﬀ in terms of price and variety distortions is unaﬀected.
42 The model
The Henry George Theorem is typically derived by optimizing the number of cities (or, equivalently,
the size of a city given the total population) in a model with identical cities and homogeneous
consumers. In order to keep the analysis simple, we stick to these assumptions.4 Our economy
consists of n cities, each endowed with the same amounts of land and other immobile factors, available
in ﬁxed supply. The total population of the economy is ﬁxed at N. The size of a city is then given
by N ≡ N/n. We assume that there are no moving costs, so that all consumers achieve the same
level of utility in equilibrium.
Let I = {0,1,...I} denote the set of indices of goods in the economy, where good 0 is taken as
the numeraire and other goods are divided into four types. The ﬁrst type M is diﬀerentiated goods
(either consumer goods or intermediate goods). We denote the numbers (or the masses) of varieties
for diﬀerentiated goods by m = {mi}i∈M. The second type G is local public goods. Both M and G
are non-traded between cities and generate agglomeration forces. The third type L consists of land
and other ﬁxed factors whose supplies are given in each city. L is also non-traded between cities but
generates dispersion forces. We assume that adding a new city increases the supplies of these goods,
and henceforth refer to them as ‘land’. The last type H may or may not be traded, and includes all
remaining goods as well as housing, which we call ‘other goods’. Hence I = {0} ∪ M ∪ G ∪ L ∪ H.
We ﬁrst consider the case where only M goods generate agglomeration forces. The analysis of
local public goods is relegated to Section 5. The utility function of a representative consumer is given




is a vector of goods that can be
divided into our four categories: the numeraire, x0; diﬀerentiated goods {xij,j ∈ [0,mi]}i∈M; land
{xi}i∈L; and other goods {xi}i∈H.5 Note that x may include intermediate goods, which always take
the value zero for ﬁnal consumers. Each diﬀerentiated good is provided as a continuum of distinct
varieties, ranging from 0 to mi. The masses of varieties m can be either ﬁxed or endogenously
determined in the model. Later, we restrict ourselves to the symmetric case where, for any i ∈ M,
xij = xi for all j ∈ [0,mi] in equilibrium. Finally, each consumer has an initial endowment vector x
where, for any i ∈ M, xij = 0 for all j ∈ [0,mi].
2.1 Consumption
Let p = (p0,{pij,j ∈ [0,mi]}i∈M,{pi}i∈L,{pi}i∈H) be the vector of consumer prices and U be the
common equilibrium utility. The compensated demand functions xi(p,m,U) and xij(p,m,U) are









pijxijdj s.t. U(x,m) ≥ U.
4It is not diﬃcult to generalize the framework to heterogeneous cities and consumers, in which case the HGT holds
approximately for the marginal city. See Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989) and Arnott (2004) for an overview.
5Note that m in the utility function indicates that utility depends directly on product diversity, as has been
emphasized by, e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).




, i / ∈ M and pij =
∂U(x,m)/∂xij
∂U(x,m)/∂x0
, i ∈ M, j ∈ [0,mi]. (1)
The masses of varieties are determined by the entry decisions of producers. The consumers, however,
have the option of not consuming all the varieties that are produced. In order for the varieties to be
consumed, we must have:6
∂U(x,m)/∂mi
∂U(x,m)/∂x0
≥ pijxij, i ∈ M, j ∈ [0,mi]. (2)
Since all N consumers in a city beneﬁt from an additional variety, the consumer-side shadow price




≥ Npijxij, i ∈ M, j ∈ [0,mi]. (3)
Note that when conditions (2) hold, the consumer-side shadow price of product diversity is larger
than or equal to the total expenditure on a variety in a community. In this sense, varieties can be
undersupplied but are never oversupplied.
2.2 Production
Production in a city is given by the aggregate production function F(Y,m) = 0, where Y =(Y0,{Yij,
j ∈ [0,mi]}i∈M,{Yi}i∈L,{Yi}i∈H) is an aggregate net output vector.7 For simplicity, we assume
that production does not require land. The shadow prices on the production side p − t may diﬀer
from consumer prices p in a second-best world due to price distortions t, e.g., monopoly power
or taxes.8 Following Boadway and Bruce (1984), we assume that price distortions are given by
t = (t0,{tij,j ∈ [0,mi]}i∈M,{ti}i∈L,{ti}i∈H).9 We normalize the shadow prices such that t0 ≡ 0.
The producer shadow prices satisfy
pi − ti =
∂F(Y,m)/∂Yi
∂F(Y,m)/∂Y0
, i / ∈ M and pij − tij =
∂F(Y,m)/∂Yij
∂F(Y,m)/∂Y0
, i ∈ M,j ∈ [0,mi]. (4)
Because we examine only the marginal conditions, this representation of price distortions is quite
general. The producer shadow price of increasing the mass of varieties of good i ∈ M is given by




We write the aggregate supply functions as Yi(p,m,t). This formulation permits both monopolistic
as well as competitive behavior of producers as long as net outputs are uniquely determined.
6This condition assumes that the variety index j can be ordered so that the marginal rate of substitution between
variety and the numeraire is decreasing in j.
7Note that m in the production function indicates that production depends directly on product diversity, as has
been emphasized by, e.g., Ethier (1982), Fujita (1989) and Fujita et al. (1999) in the new trade, the urban economics
and the NEG literature.
8In the case of intermediate goods, we use the convention that the demand-side prices are denoted by p.
9In general, the vector of price distortions t can depend on the number of cities n. We suppress this argument to
alleviate the notational burden.
62.3 Market clearing conditions
Denoting the Allais surplus by A (Allais, 1943), we can express the market clearing conditions as






For the diﬀerentiated goods, which we assume to be non-tradable, market clearing in each city is
given by (recall that there are no initial endowments of diﬀerentiated goods):
Nxij(p,m,U) = Yij(p,m,t), ∀i ∈ M, ∀j ∈ [0,mi]. (7)
Recall also that land has a special characteristic, namely that if the number of cities increases, the
total available land increases by Xi for i ∈ L of the added city. The resource constraint for land is
hence:
Nxi(p,m,U) − nXi = nYi(p,m,t), ∀i ∈ L. (8)
For the other goods, which may or may not be traded, we have
N[xi(p,m,U) − xi] = nYi(p,m,t), ∀i ∈ H. (9)
Note that the equilibrium conditions for non-traded goods must hold for each city separately, but
at a symmetric equilibrium, these constraints are always satisﬁed. We therefore use the aggregate
market clearing conditions (9) in what follows, no matter whether the goods are traded or not.
3 A second-best Henry George Theorem
In this section we consider the eﬀects of changing the number n of cities (or equivalently, the size
N of a city given the total population N). For each n, one can obtain the equilibrium values of all
endogenous variables with consumers’ utility levels ﬁxed at U. We do not specify how the equilibrium
is obtained as our framework can incorporate many diﬀerent models. We simply assume that, given
the number of cities, a unique equilibrium {p(n),Y(n),m(n),A(n)} exists.10
We now derive the welfare changes caused by a change in the number of cities, dA(n)/dn. The
following theorem provides an extension of Harberger’s measure of welfare change (Harberger, 1964),
i.e., the weighted sum of induced changes with weights being the price distortions. This Harberger
formula immediately yields our second-best Henry George Theorem:
Theorem 1 (Harberger Formula and Second-best Henry George Theorem) An increase in
the number of cities changes the Allais surplus by
dA
dn
= FS − EB,
10Though this assumption is a strong one, which need not be satisﬁed in general, it will be satisﬁed in the various
applications we present in the remainder of this paper.
7where FS and EB are respectively the ﬁscal surplus of a city and the excess burden created by adding
a city. The ﬁscal surplus is the sum of total proﬁts and aggregate land rents in a city evaluated at
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When the number of cities is optimal, dA/dn = 0 and the ﬁscal surplus equals the excess burden
caused by increasing the number of cities: FS = EB. With only one type of diﬀerentiated good, the
excess burden can be expressed as:
EB = −N



























where we may suppress subscript i ∈ M for the diﬀerentiated good.
Proof: See Appendix A1.
The ﬁscal surplus of a city is the sum of total proﬁts and aggregate land rents of that city.
The excess burden is the weighted sum of induced changes in consumption and in product diversity
(dxi/dn, dxij/dn and dmi/dn), with weights being the price and variety distortions (ti, tij and tmi).
If ti is positive, i.e., the consumer price of good i is higher than its producer price, then an increase
in the number of cities dn > 0 reduces the excess burden provided that its consumption increases
dxi > 0. This is natural because the consumer price represents the marginal beneﬁt of the good for a
consumer, whereas the producer price represents its marginal social cost of production. If the former
exceeds the latter, an increase in consumption results in net social beneﬁts, i.e., a reduction in the
excess burden. A similar reasoning applies to the variety distortion tmi.
The Harberger formula (10) includes induced changes in all the consumption goods and varieties,
but one of them is not independent because the utility level is ﬁxed in the Allais surplus measure. If
there is only one type of diﬀerentiated good, we can exploit this constraint to eliminate the change
in the mass of varieties from the formula to obtain (11). This simpliﬁed formula shows that two
eﬀects play critical roles in determining the sign of the excess burden: (i) the diﬀerence between the
price margin of each variety and that of product diversity; and (ii) the diﬀerence between the price
margin of each consumption good and that of product diversity.
Some additional comments are in order. First, when there are no distortions, the excess burden
is zero and we obtain the well-known Henry George Theorem in the ﬁrst-best world — the ﬁscal
surplus is zero when the number of cities is optimal.
8Second, Theorem 1 can be used to investigate in which direction the HGT may fail to hold. If
the excess burden is negative at the second-best city size, the ﬁscal surplus must also be negative
by Theorem 1. As the latter is the sum of total proﬁts and aggregate land rents, the single tax on
the aggregate land rents does not generate enough revenue to cover the aggregate losses (negative
proﬁts) from increasing returns to scale activities evaluated at producer prices.
Third, observe that even when distortions exist, the excess burden can be zero. Hence, the HGT
may hold in a second-best economy. This can be seen by the excess burden formula (11) for the
special case where there is only one diﬀerentiated good. The excess burden can be zero, for example,
if dxi/dn = 0 for all i / ∈ M and if tj/pj = tm/pm for all j ∈ [0,m]. As we will see later, the latter
condition is satisﬁed in the CES model that has been widely used in the urban economics and the
NEG literature. If there is no intersectoral substitution between the diﬀerentiated good and other
goods, the former condition is also satisﬁed.
Fourth, we have so far examined the HGT using producer prices only. We can readily reformulate
the theorem in terms of consumer prices as follows:
Corollary 1 (Consumer price version of the second-best HGT) When the number of cities














equals the excess burden caused by increasing the number of cities plus the total value of price distor-













Proof: Straightforward from Theorem 1.
Last, our results so far have been derived without using proﬁt maximization conditions. Theo-
rem 1 therefore can be applied to cases where ﬁrms are not maximizing proﬁts.
4 Price and variety distortions in monopolistic competition
To derive sharper results, we now examine simple monopolistic competition models with additively
separable utility functions. In addition to separability, we make ﬁve assumptions. First, there exists
only one type of diﬀerentiated good. Second, the diﬀerentiated good has a simple cost structure,
featuring a constant marginal cost, c, and a ﬁxed cost, F. Third, this sector is imperfectly competitive
and proﬁts are zero in equilibrium due to free entry and exit. Fourth, no distortion exists in sectors
other than that producing the diﬀerentiated good. Fifth, we limit ourselves to symmetric equilibria,
denoting the consumption, the price, the price distortion, and the production of each variety by x,
p, t, and Y , respectively (without subscripts because of symmetry).
9In the case of a single diﬀerentiated good, an additively separable utility function can be generally
expressed as follows:






is the utility from the consumption of all varieties. Adding another variety with consumption xm
increases UM by u(xm). For this to be equivalent to increasing the consumption of variety m from 0
to xm, we must have u(0) = 0, which rules out all sub-utility functions such that u(0)  = 0. However,
this is not restrictive because the sub-utility function can be discontinuous as in
u(x) =
 
a + v(x) if x > 0
0 if x = 0,
(13)
where v is a well-behaved concave function that need not in general satisfy a + v(0) = 0.11
As shown by (11), the sign of the excess burden crucially depends on the price margin of a variety,
t/p, and that of product diversity, tm/pm. In the additively separable case, the results derived in the
preceding section become much simpler as we can sign both of these margins. In particular, we can
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (HGT in the additively separable case) Assume that there is a single diﬀerenti-
ated good and that the utility function is additively separable with respect to its varieties. Then the
ﬁscal surplus is FS = Π + ALR, where Π = −mF and ALR =
 

































is the elasticity of the scale elasticity of utility, deﬁned as UR(x) ≡ xu′/u. θU depends on the diﬀerence
between the price margins, both of which are nonnegative:
tm
pm
= 1 − UR(x) ≥ 0 and
t
p
= RR(x) ≥ 0,
where RR(x) ≡ −(u′′x)/u′ denotes the relative risk aversion (RRA). Furthermore,
dx
dn










11An equilibrium obtained with u(x) deﬁned above can be replicated using another utility function without the
discontinuity. As we focus on symmetric equilibria, which are bounded away from zero, there are no additional
diﬃculties in doing so.
10denote the elasticity of the RRA and the share of variable cost in the total cost of producing a variety
of the diﬀerentiated good, respectively.
Proof: See Appendix A2.
Several comments are in order. First, because distortions are limited to the diﬀerentiated good
sector, the price margins of all other goods disappear from the excess burden. Changes in their
consumption multiplied by the price margin of product diversity, however, do aﬀect the excess burden
because these changes occur simultaneously with a change in the mass m of varieties consumed. For
example, a decrease in the mass of varieties tends to increase, all else equal, the consumption of the
numeraire. Because there is less than optimum product diversity (tm > 0), this increases the excess
burden. Another implication of the assumption of no distortion in all other goods is that aggregate
land rents do not include the price distortions ti.
Second, the ﬁrst term in the square bracket of (14) captures the eﬀects of a change in the number
of cities on the diﬀerentiated good sector. Its sign depends on those of dx/dn and of θU. The former
is positive if the sum of the elasticity of the RRA and of the variable cost share is positive. Increasing
RRA (i.e., θR > 0) is a suﬃcient condition for dx/dn to be positive. However, even if the RRA is
decreasing, it can be positive, provided that its rate of decrease is small enough so that the sum of
the elasticity of RRA and the variable cost share remains positive.12 Although we cannot rule out
the case where dx/dn < 0, it is positive in all the examples that are reported below.
The sign of θU may be positive or negative depending on the diﬀerence between the price margin
of product diversity, tm/pm, and that of each variety, t/p, both of which are nonnegative. If the
former is smaller than the latter, the excess burden tends to be negative. The intuition behind this
is as follows. An increase in consumption, x, of each variety tends to mitigate the excess burden
caused by the price distortion as there is too little consumption at equilibrium. At the same time,
however, an increase in the consumption of each variety tends to reduce m. As the sign of the variety
distortion implies that m is too low, this tends to exacerbate the excess burden.
Third, the price margin of product diversity depends on the level of sub-utility u(x), unlike
in expected utility theory where the utility function is unique up to an aﬃne transformation. In
our setting, an increase in a in (13) raises θU when the sub-utility is positive, thereby increasing
the equilibrium valuation of variety.13 This result is closely linked to that of Benassy (1996), who
disentangles taste for variety from market power. In the additively separable case, his measure of
12If marginal cost were zero, the sum of the elasticity of the RRA and the variable cost share would be negative in
the decreasing RRA case. However, in that case the zero proﬁt condition (see expression (37) in Appendix A2) cannot
be satisﬁed unless the relative risk aversion is one. This is not possible since the price would be inﬁnite.
13Let θU(x,0) and θU(x,a) denote the elasticity of the scale elasticity of utility when a = 0 and when a > 0,
respectively. Without loss of generality, we can take the base utility function that satisﬁes v(x) ≥ 0. As u(x) = a+v(x)
for x > 0, we obtain







if a ≥ 0 (recall that u(x) = v(x) when a = 0). Clearly, we also have ∂θU(x,a)/∂a ≥ 0.
11taste for variety is ǫ(m) = [mρ′(m)]/ρ(m), where ρ(m) = [mu(x)]/u(mx). This satisﬁes ǫ(m) =
1 − [mxu′(mx)]/u(mx), which is similar to our tm/pm = 1 − xu′(x)/u(x). The diﬀerence is that in
Benassy (1996), holding mx constant implies that a change in m has no impact on ǫ(m), which is
not the case with our tm/pm.
Fourth, the total proﬁt in a community is negative in Theorem 2 even though we have free-entry
zero-proﬁt conditions. The reason is that it is evaluated at producer prices. In Corollary 1, which
evaluates the ﬁscal surplus using consumer prices, the ﬁscal surplus becomes FSC = EB + T, where
FSC = ΠC + ALR, ΠC = 0, and T = mtY = mF. In this version, the total proﬁt is zero and the
total value of price distortion equals mF.
Last, the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization t/p = (p − c)/p = RR(x) and the zero
proﬁt condition (p−c)(N/n)x−F = 0 are suﬃcient to determine p and x as functions of the number
of cities, p(n) and x(n). Hence, given n, these two variables are determined solely by the shape
of the sub-utility function u(x) and the cost structure of the diﬀerentiated good sector, c and F.
This implies that the signs of θU(x) and dx/dn do not depend on sectors other than that of the
diﬀerentiated good.
We now revisit some examples that have been analyzed in the literature thus far. The ﬁrst example
illustrates intersectoral distortions between the diﬀerentiated good and other goods assuming the CES
form across varieties. In that case, price and variety distortions cancel out in the diﬀerentiated good
sector. In the second example, we assume away intersectoral distortions and examine two types of
utility functions — a variable RRA form which includes the CES (or constant RRA) as a special
case, and a generalized CARA form.
4.1 Example 1: Intersectoral distortions
Theorem 2 shows that even if distortions exist only in the diﬀerentiated good sector, changes in
consumption of the other goods induce changes in the excess burden through the intersectoral eﬀects
as they are associated with changes in the variety distortion. Assume, for example, that there is a
single housing good in (12) with price pH, the consumption of which is ﬁxed to xi = h. In that case,









The ﬁrst-order conditions for expenditure minimization, the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maxi-
mization, t/p = (p − c)/p = RR(x), and the zero proﬁt condition, (p−c)(N/n)x−F = 0, all remain
unchanged. Therefore, expression (14) applies with dxi/dn = 0 for i ∈ H. Speciﬁcally, the excess













To sign it, we require information on the signs of θU(x), dx/dn, tm/pm and dx0/dn. These can be
derived once we specify utility functions.
12Let us consider a case similar to the one in Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990). The upper-tier
utility function U is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, whereas the lower-tier utility function UM is a












with σ > 1 and 0 < η < 1. The RRA in this case is constant and given by RR(x) = 1/σ, so
that t/p = RR(x) = 1/σ. The scale elasticity of utility is given by UR(x) = (σ − 1)/σ, and hence
tm/pm = 1 − UR(x) = 1/σ. Combining these two conditions yields θU(x) = 0. The sign of the
excess burden thus depends solely on the sign of the intersectoral distortion as captured by tm/pm
and dx0/dn. We can show the following result.
Result 1 (Intersectoral distortion) If the utility function is given by (15), then t/p = tm/pm =






(1 − η) > 0.







Proof: See Appendix A3.
Result 1 shows that, in the Cobb-Douglas/CES case, the ﬁscal surplus is positive at the second-
best city size, thus implying that a single tax on aggregate land rents can raise enough revenue to
implement the ﬁrst-best allocation conditional on the second-best city size. Note that as η → 0,
x0 → 0 from (41) in Appendix A3. Hence, EB → 0 as η gets arbitrarily small. This suggests that
once the intersectoral distortions disappear from the model, the HGT holds at the second best when
the utility function for the diﬀerentiated good is of the CES type. This result will be established
formally in the next subsection.
4.2 Example 2: No intersectoral distortions
Next, we consider a case where consumption of the numeraire and housing are ﬁxed, i.e., dx0/dn =
dxi/dn = 0 for all i ∈ H. We can think of this case as one where labor is the numeraire and where
labor supply is (exogenously) ﬁxed. Important for our purpose is that intersectoral distortions across
the numeraire good and the diﬀerentiated good vanish in that case. As shown in Theorem 2, only
the signs of θU(x) and dx/dn then matter for characterizing the sign of the excess burden.
14There are two major diﬀerences with Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990). First, they focus on a diﬀerentiated









j dj for UM. The reason for the latter choice is that we can show that as η goes to zero, U(x) in
(15) boils down to a special case of a variable RRA model that we analyze in Section 4.2.
134.2.1 A variable RRA form
Ogaki and Zhang (2001) proposed a family of utility functions embedding varying degrees of RRA
represented by a simple extension of the CES as follows: v(x) = (x − γ)(σ−1)/σ. Since the absolute
level of utility matters for the sign of the excess burden, we add a constant term to v(x):
u(x) =
 
a + (x − γ)
σ−1
σ if x > 0
0 if x = 0,
(16)
where σ > 1 and x ≥ max{0,γ}. We further impose a ‘love-of-variety’ condition, which can be
obtained by combining the ﬁrst-order conditions for the consumer’s choice of quantity and variety,
i.e., (1) and (2), as follows:
u(x) ≥ xu
′(x) ≥ 0. (17)
This condition places restrictions on the values of a and/or x.










This speciﬁcation hence encapsulates three diﬀerent cases: (i) CRRA (constant RRA) when γ = 0;
(ii) IRRA (increasing RRA) when γ < 0; and (iii) DRRA (decreasing RRA) when γ > 0.
The shift parameter a does not matter for the RRA or its elasticity. This is not the case for the







1 + a(x − γ)
1−σ
σ
















Comparing this expression with (19) and making use of (17) we readily see that
θU(x)   θR(x) as a   0.
In particular, if a = 0 then θU(x) coincides with the elasticity of RRA and (i) θU(x) > 0 in the
IRRA case, (ii) θU(x) < 0 in the DRRA case, and (iii) θU(x) = 0 in the CRRA case. If a is positive
(negative), then θU may be positive (negative) even in the DRRA (IRRA) case.
Using these properties, we can show the following result.
Result 2 (Variable RRA form) In the variable RRA case of (16) with σ > 1, we have dx/dn > 0.
Hence, when a = 0, EB > 0 in the IRRA case (γ < 0), EB < 0 in the DRRA case (γ > 0), and
EB = 0 in the CRRA case (γ = 0). If a is positive (negative), then the excess burden may be positive
(negative) even in the DRRA (IRRA) case.
14Proof: See Appendix A4.
These results are illustrated in Figure 1. Some comments are in order. First, in the ‘standard’
CES case (with a = γ = 0), the excess burden is zero, even in the second best. This conﬁrms the
results obtained by Duranton and Puga (2001) and by Behrens and Murata (2009). Second, if a = 0,
the sign of the excess burden depends on whether the RRA is increasing or not: the excess burden is
positive in the IRRA case and negative in the DRRA case. Last, an increase in a tends to make the
excess burden larger. Hence, even in the CRRA case the excess burden is positive if a is positive.
When taken together, these ﬁndings show that the case of zero excess burden is a rather special one.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
4.2.2 A generalized CARA form
In the CARA case of Behrens and Murata (2007, 2009), the sub-utility function is given by u(x) =
1 − e−αx, with α > 0. We extend this form to
u(x) =
 
a − e−αx if x > 0
0 if x = 0.
(20)
This sub-utility function satisﬁes u′(x) = αe−αx and u′′(x) = −α2e−αx for any x > 0. The RRA is
then given by
RR(x) = αx, (21)
which is increasing in x. The elasticity of the RRA is simply given by θR(x) = 1. Some straightfor-





θU(x) = 1 −
aαx
a − e−αx.
As in the variable RRA case, we impose the ‘love-of-variety’ condition (17) which restricts the
values of a and/or x. First, we cannot have a ≤ 0 in the generalized CARA case because u(x) ≥ xu′(x)
cannot be satisﬁed for any positive x. Second, for the case of 0 < a < 1, (17) will be satisﬁed provided
that x exceeds some threshold   x. Last, if a ≥ 1, (17) is always satisﬁed since 1 − (1 + αx)e−αx ≥ 0
for all x ≥ 0.
Using these properties, we can show the following result.
Result 3 (Generalized CARA form) In the CARA case of (20) with α > 0 and a > 0, we have
dx/dn > 0. If 0 < a ≤ 1, then θU(x) < 0 in equilibrium. If a > 1, then θU(0) = 1 and θU(x)
decreases monotonically to eventually become negative as x gets larger. Thus, if 0 < a ≤ 1, then
EB < 0. If a > 1, there exists a threshold   x such that EB   0 for x ⋚   x.
15Proof: See Appendix A5.
Observe that the special case of a = 1 in Result 3 coincides with the results derived by Behrens
and Murata (2009), who have shown that the excess burden (and hence the ﬁscal surplus) is negative
in the CARA case at the second best.15
As in the variable RRA case of Section 4.1, we can depict our results on the sign of the excess
burden in Figure 2.16
Insert Figure 2 about here.
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, increasing a increases the excess burden, reﬂecting what we have
discussed following Theorem 2. Furthermore, the excess burden is negative if a ≤ 1, thus conﬁrming
Result 3. In the range of a > 1, the excess burden is negative initially but it eventually becomes
positive as a becomes larger. There exists a value   a(α) such that the excess burden is equal to zero
and such that the associated optimal community size has zero ﬁscal surplus. In words, the HGT may
still hold, but only for cases with zero measure in parameter space. Thus, the HGT seems to fail
generically in the CARA model. However, it is worth noting that departures from the theorem may
go in either direction, i.e., the ﬁscal surplus at the second-best optimum may be negative or positive.
The precise condition for the direction of the failure crucially hinges on the value of a (and, thus, on
the diﬀerence between the price and the variety distortions). Hence, any empirical implementation
of the HGT in a second-best world with monopolistic competition will require to ﬁnely assess the
relative magnitude of the price and variety distortions.
5 Distortionary taxation and local public goods
We now apply our second-best HGT to the case of distortionary taxes that are used to ﬁnance a
local public good G. The aggregate production function is assumed to be given by F(Y,G) = 0,
whereas the utility function is U(x,G). For simplicity, we assume that there are no diﬀerentiated
goods. Hence, m no longer features in the utility and production functions. We also assume that










= nYi(p,G,t), i ∈ H (22)
Nxi(p,G,U) − nXi = nYi(p,G,t), i ∈ L
15We also derived the results for a speciﬁcation involving quadratic preferences. The results are qualitatively similar
to those in the CARA case and are, therefore, not reported here. They are available upon request.
16As shown in Result 3, we need the information on   x to obtain the sign of the excess burden in the case of a > 1.
Hence, we resort to a numerical investigation to distill the key insights of this case. To this end, we need to specify
in more detail the production side of the model and the land and housing markets (see Appendix B for further
information). The parameter values are set as follows: U = 10, α = 2, F = 0.2, c = 0.1 and b = 0.1.























or, equivalently, dA/dn = FS − EB.
Consider a simple setting where the only distortion is a property tax on housing. There are only
two consumption goods, the numeraire and housing H. There is also a single ﬁxed factor land L,
which is exclusively used to produce housing. In that case, condition (23) reduces to
dA
dn







We begin by assuming that the tax rate is exogenously ﬁxed at tH. The inputs to housing production
are the numeraire and land. The aggregate production function for housing in a community is YH =
H(H0,HL), where H0 and HL are the quantities of the numeraire and of land used to produce housing,
respectively. Production of the numeraire requires labor only and its production function is F0(N),
where N denotes as before the city size. Production of the local public good requires G0 units of the
numeraire. Then, the net production of the numeraire in a community is Y0 = F0(N)−H0−G0. The
utility function is U(x0,xH,G), where xH is the consumption of housing. The resource constraints





= n[F0(N) − H0 − G0]
NxH = H(H0,HL)
XL = HL.
We assume that the housing sector has constant returns to scale. Then, we can rewrite the
production function as H(H0,HL) = HLh(k), where k = H0/HL and h(k) = H(kHL,HL)/HL with
h′(k) > 0 and h′′(k) < 0.
The property tax is set at tH per unit of housing. The aggregate proﬁt of the housing sector is
then as follows:
ΠH = (pH − tH)H − H0 − pLHL = HL [(pH − tH)h(k) − k − pL]
The ﬁrst-order condition for k is (pH − tH)h′(k) = 1, which we can solve for k to obtain k∗ =
k∗ (pH − tH) = (h′)−1 
(pH − tH)−1 
. Letting k∗′ ≡ dk∗/dpH denote the change in relative inputs




(pH − tH)h′′ > 0.












17Observe now that the compensated demand function satisﬁes ∂xH(1,pH,G,U)/∂pH < 0. Further-
more, we can rewrite the resource constraint for housing as
NxH(1,pH,G,u) = XLh(k










Finally, from dN/dn < 0, we obtain EB < 0, i.e., the excess burden is negative.17
6 Conclusions
Most factors that cause urban agglomeration involve some form of market failure. In this article, we
have identiﬁed conditions under which the ‘golden rule’ of local public ﬁnance, i.e., the Henry George
Theorem holds in a second-best world and investigated in which directions the theorem needs to be
modiﬁed otherwise. In so doing, we have largely focused on monopolistic competition models that
are widely used in urban economics and the NEG to generate local increasing returns to scale and
in which distortions in both prices and product diversity matter.
Our key ﬁndings may be summarized as follows. First, we have shown that the HGT will hold at
the second best if and only if the excess burden from adding another community (or, equivalently,
changing community size) equals the ﬁscal surplus from doing so. The excess burden can be ex-
pressed by an extended Harberger Formula — the sum of induced quantity and variety changes from
adding another community, weighted by the associated price and variety distortions. In the case of a
diﬀerentiated good and monopolistic competition, the sign of the excess burden is determined by the
diﬀerence in the variety and price distortions, which are in turn linked to the scale elasticity of utility
and the relative risk aversion, respectively. We have shown that the price distortion tends to make
the excess burden negative, while the variety distortion works in the opposite direction. When the
sub-utility is shifted upwards, the variety distortion becomes larger and the excess burden is more
likely to be positive. Last, we have shown that the HGT only holds for a zero measure subset of
cases at the second best.
A ﬁrst natural extension of the present work would be to follow Kanemoto et al. (1996) and to use
our more general conditions to evaluate whether observed city sizes are likely to be associated with
positive or negative excess burdens. A second natural extension would be to apply our approach to
the evaluation of transport policies, as they are likely to signiﬁcantly aﬀect city sizes and the spatial
distribution of economic activity (Venables, 2007). We leave these avenues open for future research.
17We have assumed so far that the property tax rate is ﬁxed. We also extended the analysis to the case where the
local government sets a tax rate subject to its budget constraint. In that case, the excess burden remains negative
provided the cost of the local public good is small enough. Results are available upon request.
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Appendix A: Proofs
A1. Proof of Theorem 1
Given n, an equilibrium satisﬁes (6)–(9). Diﬀerentiating (6) with respect to n yields
dA
dn







20We modify this expression by using the condition that the equilibrium values satisfy the production
constraint F(Y(n),m(n)) = 0 and the compensated demand function U(x(n),m(n)) = U for any n.
First, diﬀerentiating the production function with respect to n and using the ﬁrst-order conditions




















































Recall that pi −ti (respectively, pij −tij) is the production side shadow price of good i (respectively,
of variety ij) and that mi is the number of varieties of the diﬀerentiated consumer good i ∈ M. The
latter may of course be an endogenous variable. Because of our normalizations p0 ≡ 1 and t0 ≡ 0,


























Next, since the compensated demand satisﬁes by deﬁnition U(x(n),m(n)) = U, for a ﬁxed utility





























Using the ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal consumption choice (1) and the deﬁnition of the consumer

























Note that condition (26) is an extension of the homogeneity property of the expenditure function to





























Substituting (25) and (27) into (24) yields
dA
dn




























































= Xi + Yi + n
dYi
dn




= Yij + n
dYij
dn




= Yi + n
dYi
dn
, i ∈ H. (31)











(pij − tij)Yijdj +
 
i∈L




























= FS − EB,
which proves the theorem. The simpliﬁed formula in the theorem for the case of a single diﬀerentiated
good is ﬁnally obtained by solving (26) for dm/dn and by substituting the result into EB.
A2. Proof of Theorem 2
The ﬁscal surplus consists of the total proﬁt and the aggregate land rents. Since we assume that all
goods other than the diﬀerentiated good have no price distortion, the proﬁts evaluated at producer
prices are zero except for the diﬀerentiated good. The producer price of the diﬀerentiated good is the
marginal cost, c, and the proﬁt of a diﬀerentiated good producer (evaluated at producer prices) is −F.
Hence, the total proﬁt in the diﬀerentiated sector (evaluated at producer prices) is Π = −mF < 0.
Since the land rent is, by assumption, not distorted, the ﬁscal surplus is then simply given by:




The excess burden can be obtained as follows. Using (11) from Theorem 1 and imposing symmetry



























We now investigate the signs of t/p and of tm/pm. First, let δ > 0 denote the Lagrange multiplier.
Then, under the regularity assumptions, the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal consumption can be
uniquely solved to yield the compensated demand function

























22is the price elasticity of demand or, equivalently, the inverse of the RRA. Since the demand curve is
downward sloping, the price distortion t is always positive.




pm − (cY + F)
pm
. (33)
In the second-best with free entry, the zero-proﬁt condition implies that (p − c)Y = F. From this







where the inequality follows from (3).
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions for the consumer in (1) and (3), the consumer side shadow price





The additively separable utility function satisﬁes ∂U/∂m = u(x) and ∂U/∂xi = u′(x) for any variety












= 1 − UR(x), (36)
where UR(x) denotes the scale elasticity of utility. The excess burden can therefore be expressed as
in equation (14).
Next, the sign of dx/dn can be obtained as follows. From the zero-proﬁt condition and from
p = c/(1 − RR(x)), we readily obtain






− F = 0. (37)
For convenience, let us rewrite this expression as follows:
xRR(x) + φn[RR(x) − 1] = 0, (38)
where φ ≡ F/(cN) > 0 is a bundle of parameters. Diﬀerentiating (38) with respect to x and n, and









, where ̟ =
cY
cY + F
denotes the share of the variable cost in the total cost of producing a variety of the diﬀerentiated
good. Since the proﬁt margin in (37) must be positive, we have 1 − RR(x) > 0. Hence,
dx
dn
  0 as θR + ̟   0.
23A3. Proof of Result 1
The only step that has not been proved is the sign of dx0/dn. In order to sign this derivative, observe























From the zero-proﬁt condition (p − c)Nx − F = 0 and the proﬁt maximizing price p = σc/(σ − 1),
we obtain the following relationship between the number of communities n and consumption of the
diﬀerentiated good x:











where φ ≡ F/(cN) is a constant term. Substituting both (40) and (41) into the utility function (15)




























































(1 − η) > 0.
A4. Proof of Result 2
It remains to be proved that dx/dn > 0. As shown in Appendix A2, the zero-proﬁt condition can
be expressed as in (38). Substituting (18) into that condition and recalling that φ ≡ F/(cN) yield
x
2 − (σ − 1)φnx + σγφn = 0. (45)
24Note that the smaller root of this quadratic equation is either negative or unstable so that we can

























(σ − 1)x − 2σγ
[(σ − 1)x − σγ]
2.
When γ ≤ 0, the proﬁt is increasing in x for non-negative values of x, as depicted in the top panel of
Figure 3. In this case, the smaller root is negative and the larger root is the only possible solution.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
In the DRRA case where γ > 0, the proﬁt is increasing in x when x > 2σγ/(σ − 1), but decreasing
when x < 2σγ/(σ − 1). Furthermore, the proﬁt tends to +∞ when x approaches σγ/(σ − 1) from
above, and to −∞ when approached from below. As depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 3, if real
roots exist, both of them are positive in this case. It is easy to see that the equilibrium associated
with a smaller x is unstable.18
The larger root of the zero proﬁt condition is computed as follows:
x =
(σ − 1)φn +
 










(σ − 1) +
(σ − 1)2φn − 2σγ
 
φn[(σ − 1)2φn − 4σγ]
 
φ.
If γ ≤ 0, we readily obtain dx/dn > 0. When γ > 0, we require that (σ − 1)2φn − 4σγ > 0 for real
roots to exist. In that case, we also have (σ − 1)2φn − 2σγ > 0, thus showing that dx/dn > 0.
A5. Proof of Result 3
Let us examine the sign of θU for the case of a > 0. First, it is obvious that θU(0) = 1 when a  = 1.
When a = 1, by l’Hˆ opital’s rule, we have
θU(0) = lim



















a − (1 + αx)e−αx
(a − e−αx)2 ≤ 0,
18Since a ﬁrm exits when it makes losses, if x gets slightly larger than the smaller root xL, the number of ﬁrms
decreases, which increases consumption x of each variety and thus moves the equilibrium towards the larger root xH.
If x happens to become smaller than xL, the number of ﬁrms increases, which makes x even smaller and so on. Using
a similar reasoning, we can show that the larger root xH is stable.
25where the inequality is again obtained from (17). Hence, if a = 1, then θU(0) = 0 and it decreases as
x gets larger. In the case of a > 1, θU(0) = 1 and θU(x) decreases monotonically as x gets larger. In
the case of 0 < a < 1, θU(0) = 1 but x = 0 does not satisfy the inequality in (17). For the smallest
x that satisﬁes the inequality in (17), we have a − e−αe x = α  xe−αe x, which implies θU(  x) = −α  x < 0.
From this point on, θU(x) decreases monotonically as x gets larger.
Next, let us examine the sign of dx/dn. As shown in Appendix A2, the zero-proﬁt condition can
be expressed as in (38). Substituting (21) into that condition and recalling that φ ≡ F/(cN) yield
αx
2 + φn(αx − 1) = 0. (46)






















φ > 0. (48)
Appendix B: Additional expressions for simulations
Assume, for simplicity, that there are four goods: labor (the numeraire), one diﬀerentiated good,
housing, and land. The labeling of these four goods is as follows: x0 denotes the numeraire; xi,
i ∈ [0,m] denotes variety i of the diﬀerentiated good; xH stands for housing; and xL denotes land.
Each consumer has one unit of labor and supplies it inelastically to producers of consumption
goods and housing. The total labor endowment in the economy is N, whereas the labor endowment
of each community is N = N/n. We assume that there is a one-to-one relationship between varieties
and ﬁrms, and that labor is the only factor of production for the diﬀerentiated good. Production of
Yi units of any variety requires cYi + F units of labor. Since we focus on symmetric equilibria only
(pi = p and xi = x for all varieties), the proﬁt of a ﬁrm is given by π = (p − c)Y − F, and it is zero
at equilibrium because of free entry and exit.
Housing is produced by combining labor and land, and housing production in any community
is denoted by YH. The supply of land is exogenously ﬁxed at S for all communities. To produce
YH = Nh, i.e., N lots of a ﬁxed quality h, requires −YL = S units of land and bN2 units of labor
(remember that negative outputs denote inputs). We may view the problem as one where ﬁxed
quality housing h is produced by combining s units of land and bS/s units of labor. The cost of
supplying housing of quality h (given the choice of s) is then cH(s) = pLs + bS/s, where pL is the





s2 = 0, and hence r =
bS
s2 .
26Since by deﬁnition s = S/N, we have pL = (bN2)/S. Hence, the aggregate land rents in the
community are ALR ≡ bN2. The total labor input in housing production is given by −N2b.19
Assuming constant returns to scale in the housing sector, the proﬁt in that sector is given by
πH = pHNh − N
2b − pLS,
which must be zero at equilibrium. Hence, pH = (2bN)/h. Last, the ﬁscal surplus is just given by
the diﬀerence between aggregate land rents and aggregate ﬁxed costs in the diﬀerentiated sector, as
shown by Theorem 2: FS = bN2 − mF.
Observe that the market clearing condition for labor requires that















where the ﬁrst term in braces denotes the labor used for the production of diﬀerentiated varieties,
and where the second term denotes the labor used to produce housing. As before, A denotes the
Allais surplus. Since U = mu(x(n)) = U at any symmetric equilibrium, we have m = U/u(x(n)),
which allows us to rewrite the foregoing expression as follows:
















The optimal number of communities n satisﬁes dA/dn = 0. It is slightly more convenient for












where we may view x as a function of N.
Given the CARA sub-utility used in Section 4.2.2, we can then easily run numerical simulations
and draw pictures like Figure 2.
19Note that similar expressions obtain in standard monocentric city models with linear commuting costs and ﬁxed





θU = 0 EB > 0
EB < 0











Figure 2. Generalized CARA case – sign of excess burden in (α,a)-space
28Figure 3. Equilibrium x in the variable RRA case
29